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Introduction 
Scotland's relations with her southern neighbour, England, were often bad, 
and for significant periods there was outright war between the two countries. 
In these circwnstances it might be expected that a system of defence would 
be developed, perhaps combining regular patrols, on land and sea, with 
physical barriers and strongholds. Administrative arrangements would 
surely be in place to allow large defence forces to be brought speedily to 
deal with any invasion in force. Curiously, such a comprehensive system of 
defence has not been suspected by historians or castle experts, nor does it 
immediately appear that the evidence for one has been missed. 
The Scots normally placed all their trust in themselves in person for 
the defence of their country, not fortifications or mercenaries. There were 
feudal obligations on some landholders dating back to the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries to provide men equipped for war, but the main basis for 
service by most throughout the Medieval Period was the age old obligation 
on the able-bodied to join the host or common army for the defence of the 
realm whenever required, but normally for no more than forty days in any 
one year. That way an army of over twenty thousand combatants could be 
raised for campaigns in the sixteenth century. The national host would 
normally have been rather less in size in earlier times, but estimates of its 
size then are little better than guess work. 1 The Scottish army remained 
largely an amateur affair until the creation of effective militia armies by the 
Covenanters in the civil wars of the seventeenth century. 
How the Scots dealt with the Border itself and transgressions across 
it is worthy of further examination. In popular Scottish belief the country 
can be viewed as a heroic Celtic nation keeping the English at bay, and 
prior to that the might of imperial Rome. The defence of a borderline ought 
to be key to this type of historical analysis, and it is the purpose of this 
paper to provide an overview of how that might have worked in the years 
from the emergence of a strong, unified northern kingdom to the union of 
the crowns of Scotland and England in 1603. 
D. H. Caldwell, 'The Use and Effect of Weapons: The Scottish 
Experience', Review of Scottish Culture, 4 (1988), pp. 53-55; D. H. 
Caldwell, Scotland's Wars and Warriors. Winning against the odds 
(Edinburgh: The Stationery Office, 1998), pp. 22-23, 26-27. 
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The Border (see Maps 1 and 2) 
"The Border" is a concept that is readily understood by Scots and clearly 
identified as the frontier with England, running from Gretna at the head of 
the Solway Firth to the lower reaches of the River Tweed, excepting 
Berwick-upon-Tweed at the river-mouth. The frontier zone with England 
might reasonably, however, be thought of as a much wider area extending 
westwards along the Solway Firth and round the south or north end of the 
Isle of Man depending on the period in question. Scotland was awarded 
Man by Magnus, King of Norway, through the Treaty of Perth in 1266 and 
last held it in 1333. The Scots never forgot that this was part of their 
heritage and briefly took the island again in 1456, about when King James 
II' s younger son, Alexander, was given the subsidiary title of Lord of Man 
when he was made Duke of Albany. 2 The island was also overrun by a joint 
raid mounted by the MacDonalds and the MacLeans in 1533, not apparently 
without the connivance or tacit approval of King James V.3 
The frontier with England should also be perceived to have 
continued even further westwards to Ireland. The complex interrelationships 
of Scotland and the Scots with that country and its people have not received 
the attention they deserve. King Robert Bruce's brother Edward, was King 
of Ireland from 1316 until his death in 1318, and while the Wars of 
Independence effectively ended the possibility of Scotsmen and Englishmen 
owning land in both Scotland and England the same was not the case for 
Ireland. There, English administrations had to thole considerable 
penetration by families originating in the West Highlands and Islands and 
deal with the constant threat of military incursions from those parts, often 
funded and supported by native Irish lords. Clann lain Mhoir under the 
leadership of the MacDonalds of Dunyvaig (!slay) held considerable lands 
in Antrim and the two main clan leaders, Angus MacDonald of Dunyvaig 
and Sorley Boy, had their status as Irish (and therefore English) landholders 
recognised by Elizabeth I in 1586.4 Kings Edward I and Edward II viewed 
Ireland as a significant source of supplies and men for their campaigns in 
Scotland in the early fourteenth century. Six thousand foot and a thousand 
hobelars (lightly armed horsemen) were sought in 1322, although then, as in 
N. Macdougall, James III A Political Study (Edinburgh: John Donald, 
1982), p. 37, pp. 42-43; 'Stewart, Albany, Duke of Albany', in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, http://www.oxforddnb.com. 
D. H. Caldwell, !slay The Land of the Lordship (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2008), 
pp. 80-81. 
For reviews of these Scoto-Irish links see G. A. Hayes-McCoy, Scots 
Mercenary Forces in Ireland (1565-1603), (Dublin: Edmund Burke, 1996; 
a facsimile reprint of the 1937 edition); S. Duffy (ed.), Robert the Bruce's 
Irish Wars ( Stroud: Tempus, 2002); Caldwell, !slay, pp. 77-103. 
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earlier campaigns, less may have been delivered in practice. 5 In the later 
medieval period the military traffic was all one way, from Scotland to 
Ireland, but the union of the crowns in 1603 gave King James VI and I the 
opportunity of turning Irish-based resources against the incorrigibly 
contumacious MacDonalds. For instance, in 1615 the men and siege guns 
that reduced their castle ofDunyvaig to surrender came from Dublin.6 
The evolution of the Anglo-Scottish (land) Border took many years. 
A significant date is 1018 when a northern army under Malcolm II of the 
Scots along with Owen the Bald of Strathclyde defeated a Northumbrian 
army at Carham on the River Tweed. Over the succeeding centuries the 
borderline in the east of Britain was to change on several occasions but the 
Tweed was to become a default position that still marks the division 
between England and Scotland to this day. The only long term departure 
from the Tweed as a frontier was the annexation by the English of the 
Scottish burgh of Berwick-upon-Tweed, on the north side of the mouth of 
the Tweed. It was last held by the Scots in 1482. In the west the Solway 
Firth was to mark the dividing line, with the Tweed-Solway line being 
confirmed by the Treaty of York in 1237. A relatively minor adjustment 
was made by agreement in 1552 when the so-called Debateable Land in the 
south-west between the River Sark and the River Esk was divided between 
the two countries. 
The administration of this international frontier is also reasonably 
well known. Prior to the Wars of Independence border issues were dealt 
with by the relevant sheriffs. By the sixteenth century administrative 
arrangements were in place on both the English and the Scottish side for 
dealing with relatively minor infringements of the sovereignty of the two 
countries. There were three marches on each side of the border, an East, 
Middle and West, each under the care of an official called a warden. The 
Scottish East March covered Berwickshire, extending from the east coast 
inland to Lauder and Hume, and included the fertile farmlands of the Merse. 
The Scottish Middle March consisted of the shires of Peebles, Selkirk and 
Roxburgh, but in the sixteenth century Liddesdale, essentially the parish of 
Castleton with a twenty mile stretch of the border, was separated off and 
placed under the care of a keeper who had the same status as a warden.7 
Liddesdale included the important fortress, Hermitage Castle, and a 
M. Brown, Bannockburn The Scottish War and the British Isles, 1307-
1323 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), pp. 83-84, 163. 
Caldwell, !slay, p. 99. 
T. Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University, 1966). 
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significant concentration of tower-houses. The West March brought 
together the shires of Dumfries and Kirkcudbright with a relatively short 
land frontier but a long southern border along the Solway Firth. 
The wardens provided a frontline of defence and could call out all 
the men of the Marches who were liable for military service. They could 
base defence and counterattack on strongholds held by themselves or other 
border nobles, sometimes at royal expense.8 In periods of war lieutenants of 
the Marches could be appointed to whom the wardens were subordinate and 
who could better control the military resources of all the marches. 
Much, perhaps most, of medieval cross-border warfare is unrecorded, 
involving small forces of a hundred or fewer reivers (border raiders), often 
mounted and essentially looking for animals and other booty to take home. 
Sometimes raids were much larger affairs, organised by leading chiefs or 
nobles, but still with the prime function of making money. The dividing line 
between legitimate military activity that was sanctioned by the State or 
pillaging and robbery that was criminal, was often difficult for all parties to 
agree on, but it was the latter that the wardens and other border officials 
should have been attempting to suppress and seek redress for. 
Whether the Scots or the English were better at reiving and raiding, 
or made more out of it in the long term, is a matter that has not been settled, 
but the Scots certainly benefited greatly at certain periods, not least in the 
years of ascendancy under Robert Bruce after his victory at Bannockburn in 
1314.9 In times of out and out war as well as relative peace reiving was a 
constant risk or opportunity, and one that was tolerated, if not encouraged 
by Scottish and English administrations. James V's notorious, but not 
reliably documented, suppression ofborder reivers in the late 1520s or early 
1530s was the exception rather than the rule. 10 Cross-border raids were an 
activity that could only be effectively suppressed when there was whole-
hearted commitment to do so from the political establishment on both sides 
of the Border, as increasingly in the later part of the sixteenth century and 
decidedly after 1603.11 
lO 
II 
Rae, Scottish Frontier, pp. 43-47. 
For a general survey of reiving see G. MacDonald Fraser, The Steel 
Bonnets. The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers (London: Pan, 
1979). 
J. Cameron, James V The Personal Rule, 1528-1542 (East Linton: 
Tuckwell, 1998), pp. 70-92. 
J. Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 
University Press, 1999), pp. 254-263. 
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Given that the Border was formed and maintained for much of its 
history in conditions of hostility between Scotland and England it is perhaps 
surprising that it shifted so little and remained so relatively undefended. 
From a topographical viewpoint there was no overwhelming logic to the 
selection of this particular line, running for much of its length over the top 
of the Cheviot Hills. It was distinctly disadvantageous to the Scots since 
much of their best land in the Merse was adjacent to the Tweed. 
The ancient Romans, who are generally considered to have had a 
good understanding of geography and military matters, demonstrated that 
Britain could effectively be divided north-south, but on lines different to the 
medieval frontier. The Emperor Hadrian was responsible for the wall of 
about 122 AD that bears his name, stretching from Bowness on the Firth of 
Solway to Wallsend on the north bank of the River Tyne. Twenty years later 
the Emperor Antoninus Pius had a new frontier wall built between Old 
Kilpatrick on the Clyde and Carriden on the Forth. Both these walls 
survived into medieval times as obvious monuments, and their construction 
by the Romans or ancient Britons, and function as barriers or frontiers, was 
commented on by historians, for example, John Fordun writing in the late 
fourteenth century. He misattributed Hadrian's Wall to the Emperor Severus 
in a passage of hopelessly bad history, partially derived from the work of 
the eighth-century historian Bede, but identified its function as being to 
keep out the Picts and the Scots from invading the south. 12 For the Antonine 
Wall he had the name "Grirnsdyke" and believed it had been constructed by 
the Britons immediately after the departure of the Romans, also to keep out 
the Scots and Picts. 13 
12 
13 
W. F. Skene (ed.), The Historians of Scotland, vol. 4, John ofFordun 's 
Chronicle of the Scottish Nation (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 
1872), pp. 55-57. Compare A.M. Sellar (ed), Bede's Ecclesiastical 
History of England (London: George Bell and sons, 1907), pp. 19-20. 
http:/ /v.ww. giveshare.org/churchhistorv!venerable-bede-history. pdf 
(December 11, 2008). 
Fordun, Chronicle, 80; Bede, History, 23. 
http://wwv.·.giveshare.org/churchhistorv!venerable-bede-history.pdf 
(December 11, 2008). The walls are both represented on the map of 
Britain in Matthew Paris' Abbrevatio Chronicorum of 1250-1259 (British 
Library, Cotton MS Claudius D. vi). There is a reproduction of this with a 
key to the text in P. Hume Brown, Early Travellers in Scotland 
(Edinburgh: James Thin, 1978, a facsimile of the 1891 edition), between 
pp. xxvi and 1. 
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There is no evidence that either wall served as an international 
boundary in Post-Roman times. Some stretches of earthworks elsewhere, 
including the Deil's Dyke in Galloway and the Catrail or Picts' Work Ditch 
in the East borders (Selkirkshire and Roxburghshire ), have been identified 
in the past as possible early medieval frontiers, but this interpretation is not 
now held in favour. 14 There is no evidence that a continuous barrier or 
fortification for the Scottish-English frontier was ever seriously considered, 
at least prior to the 1580s, when Christopher Dacre, an English gentleman, 
submitted to his government a plan for what amounted to a contemporary 
version of Hadrian's Wall, complete with "state of the art" bastions. His 
proposal, which would have been prohibitively expensive, was ignored.15 
The only section of the frontier that was marked by a properly surveyed and 
constructed earthwork, flanked by ditches on both sides, was the dividing 
line ("The Scots Dyke") agreed in 1552, some four miles long, through the 
debatable land at the head of the Solway Firth in the south-west. 16 
Castles and Strongholds 
The Scots did not have strong points right on the border with England, with 
the notable exception of Berwick-upon-Tweed, a burgh, in existence prior 
to the accession of King David I in 1124. Berwick was a major port and 
trading centre at the mouth of the River Tweed. It had substantial walls 
around the town and an important castle. It was captured by the English in 
1296 and thereafter changed hands more than once. It was last under 
Scottish control in 1482.17 The English developed Berwick as an important 
supply base in the Wars oflndependence and as a border fortress from 1558 






A. Graham, 'The Deil's Dyke in Galloway', Proceedings of the Society of 
Antiquaries of Scotland 83 (1948-1949): 174-185; Royal Commission on 
the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland (RCAHMS), The 
County ofRoxburgh, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1956), pp. 4 79-483, and The County of Selkirk (Edinburgh: Her Majesty's 
Stationery office, 1957), pp. 126-127. 
M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings. Mary Queen of Scots 1542-1551 (East 
Linton: Tuckwell, 2000), pp. 385-387. 
Merriman, The Rough Wooings, pp. 376-380. 
G. S. Pryde, The Burghs of Scotland A Critical List (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, on behalf of University of Glasgow , 1965), no. 1. 
Trace italienne fortifications had massive earthwork ramparts with large 
pointed bastions positioned in such a way that pieces of artillery in 
positions recessed behind the flank of one bastion could frre along the 
front of the adjacent ramparts and bastion. As the name suggests, this style 
of fortification was developed in Italy, and made its earliest appearance in 
Britain in the middle of the sixteenth century. See D. H. Caldwell and G. 
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notable English strongholds on the south bank of the Tweed, Norharn Castle 
and Wark Castle, both dating to the early twelfth century. Along with 
Berwick they were maintained through to the sixteenth century and were 
together a useful check on Scottish invasions into the English East March. 
King James IV showed considerable determination to reduce Wark and 
Norham with his artillery train in campaigns in 1492, 1493 and 1513, and 
would probably have gone on to tackle Berwick as well if he had not met an 
untimely death at Flodden in 1513. The English, like the Scots, had no 
fortresses positioned on the rest of the frontier. 
Scottish administrations could think in terms of establishing groups 
of castles to serve as lines of defence. The obvious example dates to the 
reign of James IV (1488-1513). It is the line of castles, refurbished or newly 
built, the length of the peninsula of Kintyre and Knapdale. From north to 
south it includes Castle Sween, Tarbert, Skipnes, Airds, Saddel, Kilkerran 
and Dunaverty, mostly in the hands of trusted royal supporters than royal 
garrisons. 19 Here the intention was to threaten or provide a defence against 
the powerful and often hostile Lordship of the Isles which had shown itself 
capable of mounting devastating raids into the Firth of Clyde and 
encroaching on royal lands there. 
If defence and attack of Berwick is excepted, it would appear that the 
Scots never made any serious attempt to repulse a major English force at the 
Border. Nor is it apparent that the Scots ever developed a clear, overall 
strategy for defensive lines inland from the Border, although the distribution 
of some early royal burghs and castles appears to make a line based on 
Berwick in the east, then westwards by Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Selkirk and 
Peebles. With the possible exception of Selkirk, all date back to the mid 
twelfth century or earlier, all had royal castles, and except Jedburgh, were 
administrative centres for sheriffs.20 All were on potential invasion routes 
and could have acted as effective military bases - garrisons, supply bases 
and muster locations. There is widespread belief that Scottish towns lacked 
defensive walls but these burghs may not all have been totally unprotected. 
19 
20 
Ewart, 'Excavations at Eyemouth, Berwickshire, in a mid 16th-century 
trace italienne Fort', Post-Medieval Archaeology, 31 (1998), pp. 61-119. 
RCAHMS, Argylll (Edinburgh: RCAHMS, 1971), 157-184; RCAHMS, 
Argyll 7 (Edinburgh: RCAHMS, 1992), pp. 245-259. 
Pryde, Burghs, nos 2, 10, 17, 41. For the castles see RCAHMS, Roxburgh 
1, 210 (for Jedburgh Castle); RCAHMS, Roxburgh 2, 407-411; RCAHMS, 
Selkirk, pp. 47-49; RCAHMS, Peebleshire 2 (Edinburgh: RCAHMS, 
1967), p. 263. 
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Certainly Roxburgh had walls, and Peebles by the 1570s.21 Further south 
and west the royal burgh of Dumfries with its castle, also a centre of a 
sheriffdom, protected Nithsdale, and the Bruce burgh and castle at 
Lochmaben covered Annandale and the route northwards to Lanark, 
approximating to the present M74.22 Such strategic thinking, however, did 
not square with the successful tactics adopted by King Robert Bruce and 
other Scottish commanders in the Wars of Independence. They notoriously 
preferred guerrilla warfare and the destruction of castles once they had 
captured them. 
An act of parliament of 1535 ordered that every man in the Borders 
with land worth £100 should build a barmkin (a fortified enclosure) of stone 
and lime, three score foot square (about eighteen metres square), with walls 
an ell (about a metre) thick and six ells high, for protecting himself, his 
tenants and their property in troublesome times. A tower might be included 
in the barmkin. Men of lesser resources should build peels (defensive 
palisades) and "~eat strengths" as they please. All this was to be done 
within two years. 3 
There is no evidence that the passing of this act presaged the 
building of numerous barmkin, towers and peels of the specified types. 
Rather, most men of any substance would probably have already looked to 
their own safety by erecting such defences. When the historian John Major 
wrote in 1521 of two strongholds to every league, to act as a defence against 
invaders, he was scarcely exaggerating, and this plethora of fortified houses 
was to be found in the marches on both sides of the border by the sixteenth 
century. 24 Although many of these strongholds are called castles by the 
Scots they are mostly little more than homes with a show of defence or 
houses with stout walls and a strong front door. Architectural historians now 





RCAHMS, Roxburgh 1, p. 252; C. Martin and R Oram, 'Medieval 
Roxburgh: a preliminary assessment of the burgh and its locality', 
Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland 137 (2007), pp. 357-
404; RCAHMS, Peebleshire 2, p. 277. 
Pryde, Burghs, nos 24, p. 105. 
The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, http://www .IJ'S.ac.uk, RPS, 
1535/31 (December 26, 2008). 
J. Major, History of Great Britain (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 
1892), pp. 29-30.See the map ofdefensib1e houses in southern Scotland 
and northern England about 1500 to 1625 in P. G. B. McNeill and H. L. 
MacQueen (eds), Atlas of Scottish History to 1707 (Edinburgh: The 
Scottish Medievalists and Department of Geography, University of 
Edinburgh, 1996), p. 433. 
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I. tower-houses, typically rectangular structures with a vaulted 
ground floor and three to four stories, surmounted by battlements 
or turrets. 
2. peel-houses, typically oblong, gable-ended houses with clay-
bonded walls and a hall above an unvaulted ground floor used for 
storage. 
3. bastles, typically small, gable-ended houses with a vaulted ground 
floor and living accommodation in an upper storey. 
These houses provided a certain amount of security for the owner, 
his family and tenants, but the wise householder would probably normally 
have abandoned his home in the face of a serious threat rather than be 
trapped inside. 
A trick adopted by some Borderers to prevent the complete 
destruction of tower-houses abandoned on the approach of an invading 
force is recorded by the Earl of Surrey in 1523 when he burned the burgh of 
Jedburgh. The Scots had filled the vaulted ground floors of their towers 
with turfs and burning straw to try and prevent the English blowing them up 
with gunpowder; but Surrey, anticipating this stratagem, covered his 
powder barrels with salt hides and took with him pieces of timber to roll the 
barrels down from a safe distance "as wine doth into a cellar".Z5 
Few even of the tower-houses were well designed for mounting a 
vigorous defence and were vulnerable to destruction by artillery which was 
a real threat in the sixteenth century. An option for literally lessening the 
blow of the latter was to have the walls "vawmewred" with earth or turf to 
take the impact of gunshot. This is what Sir Andrew Ker did to his castle at 
Cess ford in Roxburghshire in advance of the arrival of an English force in 
1523 under the command of the Earl of Surrey. Despite having three siege 
guns and several smaller pieces Surrey believed he would have not taken it 
unless Ker had surrendered on terms?6 
The English recorded in 1528 that the peel of"Ill Will Armstrong", a 
notable reiver, was so strong that they could not bum or destroy it except 
25 
26 
J. S. Brewer and others (eds), Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of 
the Reign of Henry VIII (London: Public Record Office, 1864-1932), vol. 
3/2, no. 3360. 
Henry VIII Letters and Papers, vol. 3/2, no. 3039; RCAHMS, Roxburgh 1, 
pp. 128-131. 
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with axes. 27 A possible explanation of their problem comes from Bishop 
Leslie's History, first published in 1578. There, some of the houses of the 
lesser border lairds and other headmen are described as being four square 
towers, called peels, made of earth alone so that they could not be burned or 
easily knocked to the ground.28 Leslie would appear to have misunderstood 
that these were stone houses clad in earth rather than totally of earth. This 
change in meaning of the word "peel", from enclosure to tower house, was 
general in the later sixteenth century. The peel-house at Littledean in 
Roxburghshire was attacked by the English in 1544 but escaped because it 
was "mured" with earth.29 
A tower-house held by a determined garrison might be a significant 
thorn in the flesh, as Langholm Castle in Dumfriesshire, which in 1547 was 
occupied by the English. The Scots retook it, but judged that a considerable 
artillery train and a large army were necessary to achieve this end. 30 Later 
the same year it was the turn of a Scottish garrison to resist an English army. 
The tower in this case was actually the steeple of Annan Church held by 
seven gunners paid for by the government along with fifty-seven local men, 
all under the command of James Lyon. Their position was strengthened by 
having the whole ground storey of the tower "rampired" with earth, but 
even so the Scottish governor seems only to have expected them to resist an 
enemy attack for four hours without receiving relief. 
The English army arrived at Annan on the evening of Sunday 11 
September and that same night summoned the captain to render the tower. 





State Papers of Henry VIII (London: Public Record Office, 1830-1852), 
vol. 4, p. 492. 
Historie of Scotland, written first in Latin by the most reverend and 
worthy Jhone Leslie, Bishop of Rosse, and translated in Scottish by Father 
James Dalrymple 1596 (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 188-95), vol. 1, 
p. 98. 
J. Morton, The Monastic Annals ofTeviotdale (Edinburgh, 1832), 100; 
RCAHMS, Roxburgh 1, pp. 261-262. 
J. Bain and others (eds), Calendar of the State Papers Relating to 
Scotland and Mary Queen of Scots 1547-1603 (Edinburgh: H. M General 
register House, 1898-1969), vol. 1, p. 9; T. Dickson, J. Balfour Paul and 
others ( eds ), Accounts of the Lord High Treasurer of Scotland (Edinburgh: 
H. M. General Register House and H. M. Stationery Office, 1877-1978 ), 
vol. 9, pp. 85-94; G. A Bergenroth and others (eds), Calendar of Letters, 
Despatches, and State Papers, Relating to the Negotiations between 
England and Spain (London: Public Record Office, 1862-1919), vol. 9, p. 
126. 
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no heavy siege guns, only six field pieces which they laid at eight o'clock in 
the morning to beat against the battlements of the tower. Under cover of this 
barrage and also fire from several archers and hagbutters (hand gunners) 
they attempted to draw a pavise (shield) of timber up to the side of the 
tower under the shelter of which six pioneers could work at undermining the 
wall. The Scottish defenders, however, successfully managed to put a stop 
to this work by dropping great stones from the steeple top down on the 
pavise below, smashing it and killing four of the English. 
The English next set their men to cut the east end of the choir of the 
church and this had the desired effect of causing the whole end of the 
church to collapse, including part of the tower. The falling roof and timber 
killed seven of the Scots. The next step was to tum the guns against the door 
of the tower at first floor level which was only now exposed with the 
destruction of the choir. At this point, about four in the afternoon, the Scots 
lowered their flag and asked for mercy which was refused them, and so they 
surrendered unconditionally. The English commanders, after some 
deliberation, decided to spare all of them and keep them prisoners?1 
The Italian Enea Silvio Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II) has left an 
account of his journey from Scotland to England in the 1430s, including an 
incident both highlighting the prevailing feeling of insecurity and 
explaining what may be regarded as the normal function of a border castle. 
Although the particular context relates to the English side of the Border it 
cannot be doubted that circumstances would have been little different north 
of the frontier. Enea had crossed the river forming the frontier (the Tweed) 
and was being entertained at a farmhouse near or in a large town (Berwick). 
At two in the morning all the men left to go to a distant keep (possibly 
Norham) for fear of the Scots who might cross the river at ebb-tide. Enea 
was actually left behind on the excuse that the Scots would not harm a 
stranger. The women too were abandoned since any outrage done to them 
would not have been regarded as a great misfortune. Later in the night there 
was a panic caused by the dogs barking and geese cackling, and the women 
fled in all directions, only returning when it was clear that the alarm had 
been caused by the arrival of friends, not enemies. 32 
Naval Defence 
The English used ships for invasion forces and supplies on many occasions 
but Scottish administrations were slow to develop a naval policy to deal 
with this threat. Three successive kings, James III, James N and James V 
31 
32 
Calendar State Papers Scotland, vol. 1, no. 42. 
Hume Brown, Early Travellers, pp. 28-29. 
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did take an interest in ships that could be used in warfare, successfully, as 
most famously with Sir Andrew Wood as commander. In the summer of 
1489 with the royal ships the Yellow Carvel and the Flower he defeated an 
English flotilla of five heavily-armed ships which had been preying on 
Scottish shipping in the Firth of Forth. In the following year he defeated 
another force of three English ships lying in wait for him off the Isle of 
May. 33 Wood's exploits as a naval commander were to be matched later in 
the reign and the 1520s by Robert and Andrew Barton, and David 
Falconer.34 
The Yellow Carvel and Flower were probably armed merchantmen 
of no great size. With the help of French ship-wrights, however, James IV 
embarked on a programme of building larger ships primarily intended for 
war. In 1502 work was commenced at Leith on a great ship, almost 
certainly that afterwards known as the Margaret in honour of James' queen. 
The ship was undoubtedly a carrack, a broad, sturdy type of ship with high 
castles at stern and bow. She had three masts with merses (fighting tops) 
and was armed with artillery, including one large gun and several smaller 
pieces, and crossbows. When she sailed with the rest of the fleet in 1513 she 
had a crew of a hundred men and five gunners. 35 
An even larger ship, the Michael, was begun soon after the 
completion of the Margaret, perhaps in 1507, under the supervision of 
another French shipwright, Jacques Terrell, at the new royal shipyard at 
Newhaven, just to the west of Leith. When she was launched in 1511/6 it is 
clear she was an impressive ship, perhaps the largest afloat at that time. 
Contemporary sources say she was a vessel of a thousand tons, and she 
carried a crew of two hundred and ninety three men along with gunners and 
officers. 37 King James boasted to the English ambassador that she fired 
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English in 1513 James was able to put together a fleet of over twenty ships, 
including three large royal ships, well armed and provided with guns. 
Perhaps if he had lived, James could have developed these naval assets into 
an effective defence force for Scotland's east coast. Instead, the resource 
was frittered away, the succeeding administrations for the young James V 
having no concern for maintaining it. James V did take an interest in naval 
affairs after he came of age in 1528, but the resources at his command were 
considerably less than those enjoyed by his father at the end of his reign. 
Indeed, when he sailed to France in 1536 to find a wife the largest ship in 
his small fleet of six was the Mary Willoughby, an English ship captured 
three years earlier by Hector MacLean of Duart.39 For his expedition to the 
Western Isles in 1540 his fleet of six had the Salamander, a gift from the 
French king, as his flag ship, very probably with Mons, the great iron 
bombard in Edinburgh Castle, on board.40 
By the end of the reign of James V in1542 the southern coast of the 
Firth of Forth was well protected by castles, mostly in royal hands. Two of 
the main ports, Dunbar and Blackness, were defended by major royal 
castles with provision for mounting large pieces of artillery. 41 These 
fortifications may have been part of a conscious, long term strategy to 
protect the approaches to Edinburgh and the fertile, populated heartlands of 
Scotland, but as events in the 1540s were to demonstrate, they were not 
adequate. In 1544 an English army landed at Granton, then undefended, and 
proceeded to take Leith, the port of Edinburgh, from the landward side, 
despite hasty attempts by the Scots to dig earthwork defences. A few days 
later the English had little difficulty in forcing their way into the town of 
Edinburgh. Only Edinburgh castle remained secure.42 Three years later an 
English fleet, undeterred by any threat from the castle on Inchgarvie where 
the Forth narrows sufficiently for the erection of a rail bridge in the late 
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ships sheltering under the guns of the castle.43 The only other port on the 
east coast with fortifications specifically built to protect it was Aberdeen, 
with a blockhouse begun in 1513.44 
The maintenance of a strong castle and fort at Dunbar was, however, 
crucial in preventing the English establishing a "pale" (an English 
administered region) in the south-east in 1547. 45 Since Dunbar was 
perceived by the English to be too strong to capture they not only denied 
themselves the opportunity of supplying their garrisons by sea but allowed 
Dunbar to be occupied by the French forces that came to support the Scots. 
The English became reliant on overland supply routes up the coast from 
Berwick and over the hills from Roxburgh to their main base at Haddington. 
They could not maintain this situation beyond 1550, and were thus forced 
out ofScotland.46 
Naval defence of the west coast and islands appears never to have 
been a simple matter from the perspective of kings and governments mostly 
based in the eastern Lowlands. Indeed a major problem long after 1266 was 
the threat from the very naval forces, those of the Hebridean clans, that 
could have provided protection against English depredations. Indeed, 
legislation of 1430 required all barons and lords living on or near the west 
coast of the mainland to maintain galleys. The insistence that this was 
particularly to apply to those who lived opposite the Isles is an indication of 
whence it was believed invasions would come.47 
Down to the seventeenth century Hebridean clans controlled 
significant resources in ships. These were little different from Viking long 
ships - boats that were designed as troop carriers rather than vessels for 
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for the support of local lords. In 1301 Angus Og (MacDonald) is to be 
found in English service as one of the leaders of a fleet in the waters around 
Bute and Kintyre,49 and John (MacDougall) served as an English admiral in 
the years 1311, 1314 and 1315. In 1315 he took the Isle of Man for his 
English masters and helped oppose the Bruce brothers in Ireland. 5° 
Scottish administrations do not appear to have developed shipyards 
in the Firth of Clyde to match those in the east, although Dumbarton was 
used for shipbuilding and repair work in the winter of 1494-1495 in 
connection with naval expeditions to the Isles, and served as a base for ships 
in royal service in later campaigns in 1504 and 1506.51 Dumbarton was the 
only port on the west coast that had a significant level of protection, 
provided in this case by a major royal castle. James V's fleet that took him 
to the Isles in 1540 sailed from Leith. 52 
In the Post-Wars of Independence era English invasion of the west 
was rarely viewed as a serious risk. A planned capture ofDumbarton Castle 
in 1544 by a fleet commanded by the Scottish renegade Earl of Lennox with 
support from Donald Dubh, the MacDonald pretender to the Lordship of the 
Isles, failed largely through English mismanagement. 53 An English fleet 
sent from Ireland in 1558 to wreak revenge on James MacDonald of 
Dunyvaig for his depredations in that island caused damage in Kintyre, 
Arran and the Cumbraes, but bad weather prevented it striking at the 
MacDonald heartlands in Islay. 54 
Concentrating Resources 
The lieges were expected to supply their own weapons, equipment and food 
when they were called out to join the host. 55 Provision was sometimes made, 
as in 1523, 1545 and 1572, for burghs to provide food to supply the army 
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carriage horses and men to transport these supplies. 56 In 1523 four 
commissars were to pass to all the burghs on the borders and other places to 
make open proclamation that all with com, hay and fodder for the horses 
should furnish it forthwith for the army for ready money. 57 Otherwise, there 
seems to have been little expectation that border burghs or castles were 
significant arsenals or storehouses ready to supply royal or government 
forces. 
It took weeks rather than days for a successful mobilisation of the 
host (army) to counter an enemy invasion. Precise details rarely survive for 
how this was done. They do, however, for 1547. Preparations by the English 
for their invasion in September ofthat year were well known by the Scottish 
administration, and the governor, the Earl of Arran, was well prepared. 
Letters were sent out on the third of August warning the lieges to be ready 
to muster on eight hours notice. The actual instructions for the musters were 
issued on the seventeenth August, with threats and reminders being sent on 
the following days. Fiery crosses were also sent round as a sign of the 
seriousness of the situation. The contingents for the host were required to 
muster at Fala on the northern edge of the Lammermuirs severally from the 
twenty-eighth to the thirty-first of the month. 58 Other muster points on other 
occasions included Ellem and Lauder in Berwickshire, Melrose in 
Roxburghshire, Roslin Moor in Midlothian, and Edinburgh itself. 
There were many crossing points on the land frontier and routes 
through the marches for raiding parties, but for large armies encumbered 
with baggage and artillery the main options approximated to the modem 
roads, like the AI from Berwick up to Dunbar and Haddington, and the A68 
from Carter Bar to Jedburgh and Lauder. They were not well maintained or 
easy to traverse in bad weather. The itineraries of the English kings, Edward 
I and Edward II, in their invasions of Scotland are particularly well 
documented. Edward I's initial conquest in 1296 saw him take Berwick and 
journey round by Dunbar and Haddington before turning south by Lauder, 
Roxburgh and Jedburgh to secure Liddesdale. He thus, as well as heading as 
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than any other known invader.59 The English chronicler, John Hardying, 
who visited Scotland 1417 x 1421, reported the best way for an English 
army to enter Scotland was the A1 route. An alternative strategy was a 
three-pronged attack using that route and two others via Lauder and a way 
from Dumfries to Ayr, with all three armies meeting up in Glasgow. 60 In 
154 7 the English actually launched a major two-pronged attack, with their 
main force, supported by a fleet, taking the AI route, and a diversionary 
force heading west along the north side of the Solway Firth for Annan and 
then inland to Castlemilk and Dumfries.61 
Most large armies from 1430 onwards were provided with artillery 
and the administration had to deal with the logistics of putting together an 
artillery train and moving it to wherever it was required. 62 In 1496 the 
artillery for a campaign into the English East March was gathered at 
Restalrig, near Edinburgh, on the thirteenth of September but going via 
Haddington and a route over the Lammermuirs represented today by minor 
roads, only crossed the Tweed, about eighty miles away, on the twenty-first 
of September. Even this progress was on~ made possible by the decision to 
hire horses rather than requisition oxen. 3 For the attempt to take Norham 
Castle in the following year the artillery train was pulled by oxen and 
appears to have taken about twice as long on the road as the guns in the 
. 64 prevwus year. 
In mobilising forces to oppose an invasion timing was crucial, not 
least since the lieges could only be expected to serve for a maximum of 
forty days a year, and the host could at best be expected to average about 
fifteen miles a day. 65 Good intelligence or advance warning of enemy 
intentions was therefore crucial. There were two main methods - spies and 
bale fires (beacons). It cannot be doubted that from time immemorial 
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organised to any great extent in Scotland and the Scots certainly never 
developed such a network as Tudor England. It was envisaged in 1523 that 
border nobles would have "certane secret exploratouris and spyis" in 
England and he who first brought sure tidings of an invasion would be 
rewarded with ten angel nobles. 66 Much use was also made of a certain 
Allan Turner in the period 1545 to 1548 to gather information in England.67 
In "The Statutis and use of Merchis" of 1384 there is a list of sites 
for bale fires in the West March,68 and in an act of parliament of 1455 
another for bale fires in the East March, with procedures for their use. 
Reference is made to the walkers of the fords (on the Tweed) between 
Berwick and Roxburgh who would light the first warning bale fires in an 
emergency. 69 In the aftermath of the defeat at Flodden in 1513, and ten 
years later in 1523, it was ordered that bale fires were to be made in the 
Borders and Lothians as a warning of English invasions,70 and the sites and 
keepers of seven beacons along the east coast from St Abbs Head to 
Binning Hill by Linlithgow were identified by the Privy Council in 1547 in 
anticipation of the English invasion that September.71 
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the provision of artillery for 
campaigns on land and sea was an important aspect of military planning. 
Nobles and lairds did have guns, normally just for defending their castles, 
and there is little evidence that any, with the notable exception of the Earls 
of Argyll (of which more below) felt obliged to provide them for 
government or royal service, despite legislation in 1456, 1471 and 1474 
enjoining the great barons to provide themselves with "carts of war" (carts 
mounted with field-guns) for protection of the realm, and later acts of 1535 
and 1540 requiring them to have hag buts of crok (small pieces of artillery 
fitted with a mounting hook).72 These sixteenth-century acts also applied to 
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administrations.73 In terms of defence of the border it made sense to have 
the main arsenal of guns, at least from the early sixteenth century, in 
Edinburgh Castle, which was rightly regarded as almost impregnable. From 
there artillery trains could be wheeled out for service in the borders, to 
oppose an English invasion force, or to be put aboard ships at Leith. 
For most of the fifteenth century the number of guns in the royal 
arsenal was probably rather limited, but by 1513 King James IV could 
deploy an impressive number, including a siege train of seventeen pieces for 
battering down Norham Castle, two siege guns lent to O'Donnell in Ireland, 
and numerous pieces supplied for the fleet. 74 Apart from the arsenal in 
Edinburgh Castle surviving inventories show that there might be significant 
numbers of guns in other royal castles including Dunbar, Blackness, Stirling 
and Dumbarton. To these, in terms of national defence, might be added the 
guns of the Earls of Argyll, based in their castles in Argyll. The fourth earl 
was given a cannon from the royal collection in 1543 to help him perform 
his duties as Lieutenant in putting a stop to unrest in the Highlands and 
Western Isles, and he or later earls were to field this and/or other guns in 
royal campaigns later in the century. 75 The real significance of the 
Campbell's guns from our point of view is their availability to protect or 
enhance the interests of the Scots and their Irish allies in Ulster, as 
apparently in 1555 and 1558.76 
The Scottish Crown may have had at its disposal in the later part of 
the sixteenth century somewhere in the region of eighty large cast bronze or 
iron guns, some sizeable wrought iron pieces and other smaller pieces. 77 
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should be realised that on several occasions in the sixteenth century, for 
instance at Tantallon Castle in 1528 and St Andrews Castle in 1546-1547, 
the Scots failed to take fortresses, apparently because they were unable to 
bring enough fire-power to bear. At other times, for example at Leith in 
1560 and Edinburgh castle in 1573, they had to rely on guns and troops sent 
to their aid by the English. 
Flight or Fight? 
Invasion forces, the majority of which came through Berwick into the 
Merse and the Lothians, normally penetrated well into Scotland with little 
or no resistance. The Scots might clear the land in advance of their enemy 
of food and supplies and mount counter-raids into England. Thus in 1322 
King Robert Bruce led two devastating raids into England as the large army 
of Edward II lumbered as far as Edinburgh through countryside cleared of 
cattle.78 In 1385 the Scots, reinforced by a French contingent under Jean de 
Vienne, raided into the English East March as far as Morpeth when they 
became aware of a large English army led by King Richard II moving north 
towards them. The Scots and their allies withdrew, and cleared the Scottish 
countryside to prevent their enemy finding anything worth pillaging and, 
more serious for them, any food. This was probably the main reason why 
they had to withdraw after a few days. Meanwhile the Scots and French 
mounted a new devastating raid into the English West March.79 The English 
had destroyed the abbeys of Dryburgh, Melrose and Newbattle, and burnt 
Edinburgh, but from a military point of view, the Scots came out well. They 
could get more that was of value to them out of pillaging in England than 
the English could get out of Scotland. More than that, it then cost the 
Scottish government nothing to put an army in the field, but a great deal of 
money in wages and expenses for the English to do likewise. Finally, it was 
not good for the prestige of the English king or the morale of his men to fail 
to find an enemy to defeat in battle. 
A more dangerous strategy was to select a field of battle well in 
advance of the enemy and wait for them to come and attack, as brilliantly at 
Bannockburn in 1314, but disastrously at Falkirk in 1298. In 1547 the Scots 
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were seriously wrong footed by mustering at Fala on the A68 before 
realising that the main English force was coming up the A1 route from 
Berwick. A belated attempt was apparently made to dig trenches to oppose 
this onslaught at the Pease Burn defile near Cockbumspath in Berwickshire, 
but the Scots quickly came to the decision that their best opportunity for 
opposing the enemy lay in defending the crossing of the River Esk at 
Musselburgh, near Edinburgh. The disastrous defeat of Pinkie followed on 
from this.80 
Defending the Indefensible? 
The Scots had a frontier with the English which was indefensible. Equally, 
the English were no more able to defend that border, however it is defined 
in terms of length and depth, than the Scots. The Scots were much more 
vulnerable in large scale warfare since they lacked the money, resources and 
manpower of England, and many of its fertile heartlands were in easy reach 
of invading armies. Scotland's western flank also often appeared as another 
frontier zone with an inimical Lordship of the Isles which even engaged in 
diplomatic activity with the English Crown. 81 Nevertheless, Scotland 
survived as an independent nation, only joining with England in 1603 
through that country accepting King James VI of Scotland as its own 
monarch. This surely has to be seen in large measure as due to a successful 
long term strategy by the Scots in dealing with their frontier. 
It is worth re-examining the opinions of early writers on matters to 
do with the defence of the realm. Firstly John Major wrote in his History of 
Great Britain of 1521 that the Scots did not have walled cities so that they 
could get face to face with an enemy without delay. Besides there were a 
plethora of strongholds, two "to every league", which acted as a defence 
against invaders. If their cities and strongholds, particularly those in the 
borders, were protected by entrenchments they might provide shelter to an 
enemy in the event of them being captured.82 Major's view was taken up by 
the Scottish nobility in a set of "devises" drawn up in 1560, which went on 
to recommend the demolition of all the fortifications made or begun since 
the Treaty ofBoulogne in 1550, and also the French fort on Inchkeith in the 
Firth of Forth. Histories and experience had taught them fortresses had 
never preserved the country from invasions and the main reason that 
Scotland had so long remained a free nation was the lack of them, since an 
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the country before departing- "and that better it is to have a spylt [spoilt] 
countrye than a tynt [lost] countree".83 
Another early writer, John Leslie, the Bishop of Ross, wrote in his 
History of Scotland, first published in 1578, that in 1556 the nobility would 
not suffer a tax to be raised for the hiring of an army of mercenaries to 
defend the borders. This was because it was the custom, as well as the law, 
that they should defend the king's right. The kings were styled "of Scots", 
not "of Scotland" because of their trust in their people. Hired soldiers were 
not so zealous in fighting for liberty or able with such courage to defend 
their wives and children, goods and dwellings. Moreover, the realm was not 
rich enough to defend the borders and make raids against the English. 84 
Mercenaries ("wageours") were certainly an expense that Scottish 
governments rarely chose to afford, and when they did, only in small 
measure, as in 1455 when Parliament agreed to a force of twelve hundred 
spearmen and archers, divided into three forces, to guard the border with 
England.85 That number of men might have patrolled the eighty to ninety 
mile stretch of country fronting the enemy, reasonably effectively, but could 
hardly have mounted serious opposition to any large scale invasion. 
Possibly more effective would have been the force of a thousand horsemen 
that was to guard the Border in 1545 for a space of three months, but such 
measures, it has to be understood, were unusual, and in 1545 required the 
uplifting of a special tax for paying the men's wages.86 Smaller forces of 
mercenaries were sometimes employed in times of crisis to garrison castles 
near the Border. For instance, twenty-four footmen were to be feed to hold 
Ayton for forty days early in 1514, two gunners with hagbuts (hand guns) 
were paid in 1532 for holding Billie, and twelve hagbutters were hired to 
hold Home in 1547 against the approaching English.87 These are all castles 
in Berwickshire. 
The analyses of both Major and Leslie are clearly perceptive and 
well informed. Here we will finish by focussing on the latter's observation 
that the realm was not rich enough to defend the borders and make raids 
against the English. The Scots never totally crumpled under the damage 
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territories and destroy their own strongholds to prevent the English enjoying 
them. Scottish armies invading England probably generally got more booty 
of value to them than their enemies brought back from Scotland. Successive 
generations of Scottish borderers mounted raids, big and small, across the 
land frontier with England and Islesmen from Argyll and the Hebrides took 
ship to Ireland to offer their services as mercenaries to native lords or even 
to settle there. That ability and willingness to see the borders as a gateway 
to exploit militarily is what sustained the Scots. Making raids was more 
profitable as well as better strategy than defending the borders. 
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Maps 
1. The wider frontier zone, including Scotland, England and Ireland. 
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